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DOMESTIC REALITIES AND ISLAMIC LAW 
 
                     Ibrahim Sule* 
ABSTRACT 
Judicial independence has its origin in the theory of separation of powers. As for the 
judiciary, the theory means both the judiciary as institution and all individual judges and 
other personnel must be able to carry out their professional responsibilities free from any 
influence or interference by the Executive or Legislature or any other person or institution 
outside or within the judiciary. Undoubtedly, it is only an independent judiciary that can 
competently provide the necessary checks on the excesses of other arms of government 
particularly on breaches of rights and freedoms of the citizenry. This paper establishes 
that independence of judiciary is an indispensable ingredient of good governance. It also 
analyses judicial independence in Nigeria in line with some global trends and discovered 
ironically that even though the Nigerian Constitution guarantees one’s rights to have 
one’s cause heard by an independent and impartial judge, it does not guarantee 
institutional independence of Nigerian judiciary at all. And this could have been the 
reason why the fortunes of Nigerian judiciary is day by day dwindling as it is compelled by 
lack of constitutional guarantees to always beg either the executive or the legislature for 
one ‘favor’ or another. The paper also analyses some of the causes of the persistent 
crisis in the Nigerian judiciary and also highlights on some lessons to be learnt from 
judicial independence under Islamic law. 
 





 Judicial independence or independence of judiciary has its origin in the theory ofseparation of 
powers. By this theory the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary are three separate, 
distinct and independent branches of government; each arm is independent of the other arm in 
all it gets and does. As for the judiciary, the theory means both the judiciary as an institution 
and all individual judges presiding over cases must be able to carry out their responsibilities 
free from any influence or interference by the Executive or Legislature or any other person or 
institution. This principle therefore emphasizes that the judiciary should be separated from 
legislative and executive power, and shielded from inappropriate pressure from these branches 
of government, and from private or partisan interests. Ideally, independence of judiciary 
connotes ‘complete’ judicial freedom in all its ramifications. Scholars and legal writers have for 
long attempted unsuccessfully to provide convincing answers as to what are the exact 
conditions required for judicial independence. Is it about absolute budgetary control?1 Is it about 
its independence to choose or select its own members without interference from the executive? 
Or is it about the security of tenure of individual judges? Is it about the decision-making and 
freedom to render judgments without any influence either from the executive or the legislature 
or the public? I will briefly touch a number of these propositions in this paper. 
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Interestingly and perhaps for its importance, all the international human rights conventions and 
declarations and other regional human rights instruments recognize the notion of independence 
of judiciary in their provisions by guaranteeing the right to fair hearing in civil and criminal 
proceedings before an independent and impartial court or tribunal. Legal scholars, international 
human rights organizations and human rights activists all have emphasized the potentially 
important role an independent judiciary can play in good governance and in securing 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. In fact  “some assert that it is theindispensable link in the 
machinery for securing individual protection against states’ human rights abuses”.2 
Undoubtedly, it is only an independent judiciary that can safeguard good governance by 
providing the necessary checks on the excesses of other arms of government particularly on 
breaches of rights and freedoms of the citizenry. 
Article10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14(1) of International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 
Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights all guarantee the right of everyone to be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.At the 
Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Milan, 26 August - 6 September 1985, the General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary3, which set forth standards for achieving independent 
judiciary for countries all over the world. Although the basic principles do not have a force of 
law, they have been recognized internationally as setting model for countries on judicial 
independence. And over the past two decades, there has been established trend globally for 
adopting these principles in constitutions of several countries. Many of the constitutions written 
after 1970s, constituting two thirds of world’s constitutions have adopted certain provisions of 
these principles under their bill of rights, directly or indirectly.4 Generally speaking, these 
principles “represent a substantial degree of global consensus on what judicial independence is 
or should be”5.  
 
THE TREND IN NIGERIA 
In Nigeria, section 17(1)(e) of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 [CFRN] provides that “the 
independence, impartiality and integrity of Courts of Law, and easy accessibility thereto shall be 
secured and maintained”. Section 36(1) also guarantees right of every person to fair hearing 
within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such 
manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.Ironically, the word “independence” was 
mentioned only nine times in CFRN and the phrase “judicial independence” or “independence 
of judiciary” has never been mentioned at all. Nevertheless, under section 171)(e) of the non-
justiciable Chapter II in furtherance of its social order the Nigerian state shall strive to ensure 
the maintenance of the “independence, impartiality and integrity of courts of law and easy 
accessibility thereto”.It can also be argued strongly that Section 36(1) only guarantees one’s 
rights to have one’s cause heard by an independent and impartial judge and does not 
guarantee institutional independence of Nigerian judiciary at all. And this could have been the 
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reason why the fortunes of Nigerian judiciary is day by day dwindling as it is compelled by lack 
of constitutional guarantees to always beg either the executive or the legislature for one 
financial favour or another. The Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon. Justice Mariam  Aloma Mukthar 
had on Monday, September 23, 2013, while inaugurating the 2013/2014 Legal Year mentioned 
this worrisome concern when she said:  
“Statistics have shown that funding from the Federal Government has witnessed 
a steady decline since 2010, from N95bn in that year to N85bn in 2011, then 
N75bn  in 2012 and dropped again in the 2013 budget to N67bn. Indeed, with 
this, if the amount allocated to the extrajudicial organisations within the judiciary 
is deducted, the courts are left with a paltry sum to operate”6 
However, in the last two or three appropriation years the National Assembly has been engulfing 
over N150bn and the executive has “equally being taking good care of itself with more jets 
being added to the presidential fleet and humongous amount in the neighborhood of a billion 
naira appropriated for meals and incidentals, yet the fortunes of Nigeria’s judiciary dwindles.”7 
Of course this is unbelievable. Even though the drafters of the 1999 Constitution introduced the 
National Judicial Council [NJC] in good faith to secure independence of Nigerian judiciary, 
practically speaking for a number of reasons, political and non-political, and even constitutional, 
as far as budgetary allocation and control is concerned the NJC is nothing to the executive and 
legislature but a toothless bull dog. It should be noted that, a financially handicapped judiciary 
couldn’t safeguard good governance or protect the rights and freedoms of citizenry. 
 
Appointment of Judicial Officers in Nigeria 
Under the Nigerian Constitution 1999, as far as the appointment of judicial officers is concerned 
the National Judicial Council is the dominant agency constitutionally responsible for making 
recommendations of qualified candidates to high bench at state and federal levels.8 Its 
recommendations for appointment by the President is subject to the confirmation of the Senate 
in some cases like in the case of Chief Justice of Nigeria,Justices of the Supreme 
Court,President of the Court of Appealand Chief Judge of the Federal High Court,Chief Judge of 
the High Court of the FCT,Grand Kadis of the Sharia Court of Appeal, Abujaand President of the 
Customary Court of Appeal Abuja.9 Justices of the Court of Appeal,judges of the Federal High 
Court,judges of the High Court of FCT,Kadis of the Sharia Court of Appeal of FCTand judges of 
the Customary Court of Appeal of FCT are appointed by the President on simple 
recommendation of the NJC without approval of the Senate.10 For the appointment of Chief 
Judge of the state, Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal and the President of the 
Customary Court, the Governor shall make the appointment on the recommendation of the NJC 
subject to the confirmation of the State House of Assembly. 
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It is to be noted that in Nigeria like in many countries the executive – governor of a state or the 
President, is surprisingly making majority of the judicial officers’ appointments at both state and 
federal levels. It can be argued that appointment by the executive does not in itself raise any 
doubt about the independence of judiciary of a country or of a particular judge concerned.  In 
New Zealand for instance, Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and judges of High 
Court, are appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Attorney General 
advised by the Chief Justice and the Solicitor-General. For appointments to district courts, the 
Attorney General who receives advice from the Chief District Court Judge and the Secretary for 
Justice advises the Governor-General.11 
In the United States, the President of the United States, with the approval of the U.S Senate, 
appoints all Article III Judges i.e Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and 
district judges. And traditionally, Presidents “most often appoint judges who are members, or at 
least generally supportive, of their political party”12 – however, that doesn’t mean that judges are 
given appointments solely for partisan reasons. In United States each state has its own state 
judiciary, including the Supreme Court. There are varied strange patterns of appointment that 
evolved over time. Generally, for appointment to the high court, there is a pattern in about eight 
states i.e Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, West 
Virginia by which judges run on a party ticket as republicans or democrats and get appointed on 
that platform. Thereafter, they run for uncontested non-partisan elections to retain their offices. 
And in Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin judges are 
initially appointed on merit and years after they run for an election to retain their offices on the 
basis of their judicial record.13 In 1986 three Justices of the Supreme Court of California were 
recalled because of their vocal opposition to death penalty. 
Cumulatively therefore, it is not strange that in Nigeria, just like in Russia, US and Brazil that 
appointments of the superior courts judges and justices are being made by the executive. There 
is no doubt that the NJC is established by the Constitution to ensure independence of the 
judicial officers even from their appointment and to minimize executive interference, influence 
and manipulation. Nevertheless, its composition has been subject to a number of scornful 
criticisms. It has been argued that the composition of NJC has grossly violated the principle of 
federalism,14 is full of federal dominance and states have not been given any role to play in the 
appointment. The trend for selection globally leans towards a very widely publicized transparent 
mechanism, which involves wide consultations and in some places, advertisement of judicial 
vacancies, publicity of candidates’ names, backgrounds, qualifications etc. It is also best 
practice globally that the public are invited to comment on the shortlisted candidates. The 
judicial councils should also compose not only judicial officers but other actors like lawyers, law 
professors, judges of inferior courts so as to enhance the quality of the selection and minimize 
possible influence from the executive or partisan selection from other judicial officers in the 
council or even influence by the chief justice or other senior judges. In some countries like Chile, 
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even before nominating candidates to judicial council, transparent examination is being 
conducted. When a candidate passes the exam his name is then submitted to the council for 
further verification and public tests.15 Diversity is also some thing to be considered during 
judicial selection. A judiciary that reflects the diversity of its country “is more likely to garner 
public confidence” 16Nevertheless, under section 288(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal 
Republic of Nigeria the President is enjoined while appointing justices of the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeal to have regard to the need to ensure there are among them persons 
learned in Islamic personal law and persons learned in Customary law. 
Generally speaking, there is no guidance globally as to one pattern of appointing judicial 
officers. The most important is that regardless of the pattern of selection used, the qualifications 
and personal integrity of the persons to be appointed should always constitute the criteria for the 
selection. This is exactly what Principal 10 of the Basic Principles.  
Finally, it is to be noted however, that in countries where politicians are making judicial 
appointments, the trend leans more towards accountability in the judicial affairs rather than total 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
Security of Tenure 
This is the notion that once appointed, a judge cannot be removed during his term of office 
except for good cause i.e unethical or unprofessional conduct or unfitness upon following formal 
proceedings or hearing. A judge who can be removed at any time is naturally vulnerable to both 
external and internal pressures to do what is wrong. In some countries, like in France and 
Germany, not only that a judge cannot be removed without decision of a court, no judge can 
even be transferred or promoted without his consent. Security of tenure of judicial officers in 
Nigeria is a matter of constitution and is covered under sections 291 and 292 of CFRN. 
Accordingly, all heads of superior courts for federation and state in cannot be removed from 
office before their age of retirement except by the President or governor acting on an address 
supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate or House of Assembly for the state. 
However, section 291 and 292 do not in any way provide the necessary security of tenure to 
Nigerian judicial officers based on the best practices globally. In light of realities of the global 
trends on security of tenure of judicial officers, the shallowness of section 292 of the 1999 
Constitution is surprising. It literally left the mechanism for removing judicial officers on the 
hands of politicians. All that the section requires the President or the Governor to do is to garner 
2/3 political support in the Senate or House of Assembly for an ordinary letter stating that the 
judicial officer be removed for misconduct or contravention of Code of Conduct, inability to 
discharge his functions as a result of infirmity of mind etc.  
The most surprising constitutional defect of the section 292 is that it does not at all provide any 
opportunity to the judicial officer to be removed to defend himself in person or by a legal 
practitioner of his own choice before the Senate or House of Assembly. It does not contemplate 
a hearing at all, either before the President or the Governor as the case may be makes his 
political address before the Senate or the House of Assembly. This is a clear dreadful breach of 
section 36 of CFRN guaranteeing right to fair hearing. Constitution against itself! It is 
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devastating to find this arrangement in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
especially as it relates to the offices of highly placed judicial officers like the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria, Chief Judges of States etc. 
Surprisingly however, the constitutional arrangement for the removal of judicial officers in 
Nigeria under sections 276 and 277 of the 1989 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria was 
much more in line with global best practices. One step forward, ten steps backward! 
It is to be submitted that in jurisdictions where there is stringent and transparent impeachment 
procedure after a trial, judges are more confident and independent because they cannot deliver 
a decision today and wake up tomorrow just to find out on the dailies they are removed in the 
night. In the US for example, in the last 222 years, only “fifteen federal judges have been 
impeached. Of those fifteen: eight were convicted by the Senate, four were acquitted by the 
Senate, and three resigned before an outcome at trial.”17  In the last 222 years the US has only 
17 Chief Justice, while Nigeria had 12 in the last 53 years. In the last 222 years the US had only 
112 Justices of the Supreme Court and Nigeria has had 95 in 57 years.18 
 
Financial Independence: 
Funding judiciary in Nigeria is matter provided for by the 1999 Constitution. The Constitution has 
recognized directly and indirectly financial autonomy of the judicial arm in very clear terms. In 
fact funding the Nigerian judiciary is granted the status of “first line charge” by the Constitution.  
 In 2004 the total budgetary allocation to NJC was N30, 000,000,000 (2.3% of the Nigeria’s 
budget) while in 2012 the allocation was N85, 000,000,000 (1.7% of the country’s budget). And 
in 2013 the sum of 67,000,000,000 was allocated to NJC – just 1.3% of the country’s budget, 
which was N4,924,604,000,000.  One can see how the institutional independence of Nigerian 
judiciary is corroding and crumbling year after year by the disproportionate treatment judiciary 
gets through ‘conspiracy’ between the executive and legislature. The negative implication of this 
doesn’t stop at the judiciary as an institution; it is more detrimental and injurious to a common 
man than to the judiciary itself. This is because  “all the rights secured to the citizens under the 
Constitution are worth nothing, and a mere bubble, except guaranteed to them by an 
independent and virtuous Judiciary.”19 A poor-funded judiciary breeds poor members, 
intellectually and rationally who do not care about efficiency, honesty or integrity. The poor state 
of Nigerian judiciary and its catalogue of disclosed and undisclosed unprofessional allegations, 
corruption, bribery and judgment procurement is not unconnected with its poor funding; so also 
the poor performance of some of the judges at state and federal level. Charles Evans Hughes 
told us that: 
 
“A poor Judge [in terms of integrity] is perhaps the most wasteful indulgence of 
the community. You can refuse to patronize a merchant who does not carry good 
stock, but you have no recourse if you are haled before a Judge whose mental or 
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moral goods are inferior. An honest..., able and fearless Judge is the most 
valuable servant of democracy, for he illuminates justice as he interprets and 
applies the law”20 
The situation is even worse in the state judiciary as pointed out by the former Chief Justice of 
Nigeria, Hon. Justice Dahiru Musdapher when he said: 
“It is regrettable that some state chief executives treat the judiciary as an 
appendage of the executive arm. While it is true that, in some cases, this is self-
inflicted (because of the way some Judges portray themselves), it does not 
invariably follow that a distinct arm of government should, because of the actions 
of a few, be treated with disdain. Sadly, the judiciary in several states still goes 
cap in hand to the executive begging for funds...The plight of the state judiciaries 
is compounded by the fact that, in spite of the best efforts of the NJC, the 
processes of appointment and removal of Judges/security of tenure is the subject 
of political theatrics.”21 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER ISLAMIC LAW 
Appointment of judges in Sharia is being done objectively and independently by the head of 
government based on merit or by election by group of prominent scholars. This is to ensure 
that upon appointment judges are independent of the government that appoints them. One 
very unique feature of judiciary in Islam is its independence. In Islam, judicial rulings, 
decisions and interpretations are based on Quran and Sunnah of the Holy prophet (SAW). 
This guarantees that the rulings and decisions would be quite accurate, precise and perfect 
free from personal whims of the individual judges. And this also means that decisions and 
interpretations as opposed to other legal systems are going to be uniform and the same all 
over Islamic state and would continue for generations. And for this reason therefore judges 
under Sharia are further enjoined to pass down their decisions without any discrimination 
between the rulers and the ruled, rich or poor, old or young. Deciding cases based on 
social status, political affiliation or influence is not only unethical and wrong in Sharia but is 
a crime and deviation from Allah. The Holy Prophet (SAW) was reported to have said: 
"Judges are of three types, two of whom will be in Hell and one in Paradise: a 
man who judges unjustly and knowingly will be in Hell; a judge who has no 
knowledge and destroys people’s rights will be in Hell; and a judge who judges in 
accordance with the truth will be in Paradise".22 
 
It should be noted however, that even though judicial decisions in Sharia must be based on 
Quran and Sunnah, the judge himself is encouraged to exercise ijtihad (independent reasoning) 
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on issues without clear reference from Quaran, Sunnah, analogy or consensus of Islamic jurists. 
The Holy Prophet was reported have said: 
"When a judge gives a decision, having tried his best to decide correctly and is 
right, there are two rewards for him; and if he gives a judgment after having tried 
his best (to reach a correct decision) but erred, there is one reward for him"23 
Judges under Sharia must also be paid adequate salary in order to prevent them from taking 
gifts or bribe.The Prophet (peace be upon him) said:  
 "Whosoever from you is appointed by us to a position of authority and we gave 
him fees, what he takes more than that would be misappropriation (of public 
funds)”24 
A judge is Sharia as opposed to other legal system is not only a judicial officer but also religious 
officer and his authority included performing other functions and duties not purely judicial 
because of his knowledge of Islamic law. These include performing prayers at mosque, 
supervising religious places, taking custody of missing funds, missing persons, supervising 
pilgrimage, delivering Friday sermons etc.25 Shams-al-Din Ibn Tulun told us Taj-al-Din Al-Subki 
one of prominent judges of Damascus, was a judge, taught in school, delivered Friday sermons 
at Tulun mosque, gave fatwas at Da-al-Adl (the house of justice) etc.26 
Under the Islamic law judges are expected to be just and to administer the law as ordained by 
Allah without giving any regard to the parties’ social status or political position. Al Sayuti in his 
Tarikh Al-Khulafa (the history of caliphs) also mentioned another story demonstrating full 
independence of judiciary under Islamic Law. He said that there was a land dispute between a 
marchant and a commander of the Caliph Jaafar al Mansur. Caliph Jaafar Al-Mansur wrote a 
letter to the judge of Basra Swar ibn Abdullah requesting him to henceforth confiscate the piece 
of land and deliver the title to his commander. Swar wrote back to Caliph that the said land 
belonged to the merchant not the commander and he could not confiscate anything which by 
evidence was established to belong to someone. When the Caliph insisted upon his request and 
without success he said: “By Allah, I spread justice, and my judges guided me to the right”. 
Under Islamic law judges can summon caliphs and governors for testimonies or to defend cases 
filed against them. In one incident porters of Madina filed an action against Caliph Jaafar al 
Mansur who wanted to eject them to Levant. The case came before Muhammad ibn Imran Al-
Talhi jdge of Madina. The caliph was summoned. The judge warned his secretary not to call the 
Caliph with his title but with his ordinary name a party to the suit. When the Caliph arrived the 
court ibn Imran did not stand up to welcome him. At the end of the suit, judgement was given in 
favourt of the porters i.e against the Caliph. It is at the end o fthe proceedings that inb Imran 
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Mere googling the phrase “crisis in Nigerian judiciary” will send a message that all is not well 
there. The result is extraordinarily revealing of the so many crisis bedeviling our courts, our 
judges and other officers of courts ranging from demanding or accepting bribes, judgement 
procurement to some light unethical practices of being partisan.  
One of the shocking reports is from the Nigerian Tribune (online) of 26th August, 2011. The 
report is titled “FG uncovers corruption in judiciary – N106 bn traced to judgement procurement- 
judges own luxury houses in UK, UAE, S/Africa”.28 The paper claimed to base its findings on a 
‘secret report’ submitted to the federal government “which indicted a number of judicial officers 
of monumental corruption”. The paper alleges that according to investigations some properties 
were bought globally especially in Dubai, UAE, South Africa and London and the real owners 
were believed to be Nigerian judicial officers whose total emoluments cannot in anyway justify 
the purchases. The report further stated, a source privy to the paper informed them that some of 
the judicial officers were “found to send their children to some of the most expensive schools in 
the world, without taking loans.”29 
During a 2 day workshop on the rule of law organized by the NBA the CJN, Hon. Justice Mariam 
Aloma Mukhtar had in May 2013 said that “21 judges are being investigated for alleged 
breaches of principles of the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers, in the on-going efforts of the 
National Judicial Council (NJC) at overhauling and reforming the judiciary”.30 
Another disturbing story appeared on the Vanguard of 4th January 2014 captioned “EFCC 
Moves to Prosecute Seven Corrupt Judges”.31 The most disturbing is that “suspected judges are 
from the State and Federal High courts as well as the Court of Appeal”.32 
Of course one may find it difficult to ascertain the authenticity of some of these reports. 
Nevertheless, objectively speaking, even if these reports contain some doubtful facts and 
speculations, the allegations ought to be investigated in a very transparent way so that the 
public will know what really is happening. This is because in a transparent society, media 
reports like this one are like canary songs. Coal miners used to carry caged canaries into the 
mines with them. When the canaries stopped singing, they knew they were in trouble and they 
had better get out fast. The media in government and other large organizations are, in a way, 
our canaries. When they are free to `sing,' those institutions are healthy. When they are 
silenced, we are in trouble.  
The big question then remains thus: how can Nigerians have a crises-free judiciary? Nigerians 
can have crises-free judiciary when the government ensures the implementation of 
constitutional arrangements guaranteeing independence of judiciary. Nigerian judiciary can be 
crises-free when the government ensure full implementation of all the principles in the 
international instruments guaranteeing ‘inalienable right’ of judiciary to be independent - like the 
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Basic Principles on the Independence of the judiciary 1985, like the Basic Principles on the Role 
of Lawyers, 1990. Nnaemeka-Agu: 
“What cannot be doubted is that a judge must be completely independent, free 
and freed from all forms of external influence and control, before he can perform 
his functions well. This is true of judges all over the world. But, it is perhaps true 
in Nigeria where naira is the lord and some people think that even justice is a 
commodity which can be bought and sold.”33 
Unless judges play their respective key roles to the full in maintaining justice in Nigerian society 
impartially, there is a risk that a culture of impunity will prevail and justice can be for sale. 
Independence of judiciary connotes so many things. The judiciary must attain independence in 
all its ramifications. It must independently handle all matters pertaining to it. It must have 
independence as to administrative and financial matters. It must be independent as to its 
decision-making, appointments and promotions, training and education etc 
The Chief Justice of Nigeria while marking commencement of the 2012/2013 legal year and the 
inauguration of 25 new Senior Advocates of Nigeria at the Supreme Court in Abuja said: 
 
“It is the judiciary which has to ensure that the law is observed and that there is 
compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the government. Our 
courts should be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they apply impartially, without fear, favour and prejudice. Without judicial 
independence, there can be no preservation of democratic values.”34 
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